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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Alberto Varela-Terna (Mr. Varela) was charged with one count of felony DUI
(third or subsequent offense).

Mr. Varela filed a motion to dismiss the charging

information, asserting that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest him.
The district court denied the motion to dismiss.

Pursuant to a conditional plea

agreement, Mr. Varela subsequently pleaded guilty to felony DUI. The guilty plea was
conditioned on Mr. Varela being able to withdraw his guilty plea in the event that an
appellate court reversed the order denying his motion to dismiss or otherwise remanded
his case back to the district court for further proceedings.

The district court then

imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with two years fixed, and retained
jurisdiction.

After Mr. Varela completed a "rider," the district court placed him on

supervised probation for a term of three years.
On appeal, Mr. Varela asserts that his case should be remanded for the district
court to make a finding of fact as to whether his car was upon the road in the trailer
park. Mr. Varela also asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to
dismiss. Mr. Varela further asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it
imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with two years fixed, upon him following his
plea of guilty to felony DUI.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Varela drove his car to his friend's trailer home located in a trailer park in
Bonneville County. (R., p.99.) The trailer park contained about thirteen trailer homes
and one "non-trailer" residential home.

(R., p.99.)

The trailer park had a single

entrance from a public road. (R., p.99.) A single "L"-shaped road within the trailer park
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provided access to the trailers, but the road was not a through road and did not run
beyond the trailer park. (R., p.99.) Each trailer home had a driveway, with lawn or dirt
areas between the trailers and adjacent to the driveways. (R., p.99.) There was some
fencing around the perimeter of the trailer park, but there was no fence or gate across
the entrance to the trailer park. (R., p.100.) There were no posted signs restricting
access to the trailer park, but there was a posted speed limit of 10 mph and a stop sign
for vehicles exiting the trailer park.

(R., p.100.)

The trailer park was solely for

residential purposes, and no business was conducted on the premises.

(R., p.100.)

Most of the trailer homes were owned by the residents, but the lots were leased from
the trailer park owner. (R., p.100.)
After arriving at his friend's trailer home, Mr. Varela drove his car up onto the
lawn or dirt area next to the trailer, because other vehicles were parked in the driveway.
(R., p.100.) The parties disputed whether Mr. Varela's parked car was partially upon
the road within the trailer park, but the district court found: "After the vehicle was
stopped and parked, a portion of the vehicle extended into the roadway area."
(R., p.100.)
Later that night, Mr. Varela was sitting in his car with his friend and listening to
loud music. (R., p.100.) A neighbor complained to the police, and Officer Fielding of
the Bonneville County Sheriff's Office responded to the reported noise disturbance.
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.2; R., p.100.) Officer Fielding
contacted Mr. Varela and the friend.

(PSI, p.2; R., p.100.)

The officer reportedly

observed suspicious movements as he approached Mr. Varela's car, including
Mr. Varela sweeping something off the car seats. (R., p.100.) Officer Fielding noted the
odor of alcohol coming from Mr. Varela's breath, and both Mr. Varela and his friend had
2

a white powder under their noses. (PSI, pp.2-3.) Mr. Varela refused to take a breath
test, and he was administered a blood draw which gave a result of .212. (PSI, p.3.) He
was then arrested and charged with DUI. (PSI, p.3.)
Mr. Varela was charged with one count of operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence, Idaho Code§§ 18-8004, 18-8005 and 18-8008.

(R., pp.10-11.)

The

charge was later amended to one count of felony DUI (third or subsequent offense).
(R., pp.18, 36-37.) At the arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. (R., pp.39-40.)
Mr. Varela then filed a motion to dismiss the charging information, on the basis
that Officer Fielding lacked probable cause to arrest him because he was "parked in a
private residential driveway." (R., p.44.)

In a memorandum of law in support of the

motion to dismiss, Mr. Varela asserted that State v. Knott, 132 Idaho 476 (1999), where
the Idaho Supreme Court held that I.C. § 18-8004 (the DUI statute) does not cover the
driveway of a private residence, "should also be applied to a private residential parking
lot intended for private use, especially where the number of residents is relatively small
and where there is only one entrance."

(R., pp.54-59.)

The State filed a brief in

opposition to the motion to dismiss, arguing that the road within the trailer park was
private property open to the public and therefore covered by the DUI statute.
(R., pp.47-52.)
The district court subsequently conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion
to dismiss. (R., pp.76-77; Tr., p.1, Ls.3-7.) After the hearing, the district court entered
an order denying the motion to dismiss. (R., pp.99-104.) The district court found that
"the dirt area adjacent to the asphalt drive way is tantamount to a driveway and cannot
be considered private property open to the public." (R., p.103.) However, the district
court also found that the DUI statute "will apply to an intoxicated motorist even if a
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portion of the vehicle is parked on private property not open to the public. The policy
behind the DUI statute should not be considered ineffective simply because a portion of
a vehicle was off the roadway and on private property."

(R., p.103.) As discussed

above, the district court "found that the back portion of [Mr. Varela's] vehicle extended
beyond the dirt into the trailer park's roadway."

(R., p.103.)

Based on State v.

Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775 (Ct. App. 2012), the district court then found, under
the totality of the circumstances, "that the roadway within the trailer park was open to
the public, making [Mr. Varela] subject to the DUI statute." (R., pp.103-04.) The district
court concluded: "A portion of [Mr. Varela's] vehicle was in the trailer park's roadway
which was open to the public whereby [Mr. Varela] was subject to I.C. § 18-8004."
(R., p.104.) Thus, the district court denied the motion to dismiss. (R., p.104.)
Mr. Varela later entered into a binding conditional plea agreement with the State.
(R., pp.81-82.) His guilty plea was conditioned on his being able to withdraw the plea if
an appellate court reversed the district court's order denying the motion to dismiss or
otherwise remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings.
(R., p.81.) Under the plea agreement, the parties would be free to argue at sentencing
regarding a recommended sentence.

(R., p.82.)

The district court accepted

Mr. Varela's guilty plea. (R., pp.77-78.)
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Varela's counsel recommended that the district
court retain jurisdiction and place Mr. Varela on a "rider" program so that he could get
treatment for his drinking problem.

(Tr., p. 54, Ls.20-22, p.56, Ls.14-23.) The State

recommended that the district court impose a unified sentence of six years, with two
years fixed. (Tr., p.57, Ls.1-13.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of eight
years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction for a period of up to 365 days to
4

give Mr. Varela a chance to get inpatient treatment. (R., pp.92-97; Tr., p.60, Ls.3-6.)
After Mr. Varela participated in a Therapeutic Community "rider" program, the district
court placed him on supervised probation for a term of three years. (See Retained
Jurisdiction Order of Probation (Aug. 8, 2013).)
Meanwhile, Mr. Varela filed, prose, a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.107-09.)

5

ISSUES
1.

Should this case be remanded for the district court to make a finding of fact as to
whether Mr. Varela's car was upon the road in the trailer park?

2.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Varela's motion to dismiss?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of
eight years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Varela following his plea of guilty to
felony DUI?

6

ARGUMENT
I.
This Case Should Be Remanded For The District Court To Make A Finding of Fact As
To Whether Mr. Varela's Car Was Upon The Road In The Trailer Park
Mr. Varela asserts that this case should be remanded for the district court to
make a finding of fact as to whether his car was upon the road in the trailer park. The
district court did not make a finding of fact regarding whether the car was upon the road,
which was an essential finding and basically a material issue affecting the judgment.
"Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state
its essential findings on the record." I.C.R. 12(e). The Idaho Supreme Court has held
that a district court's "failure to make findings of fact on material issues affecting the
judgment requires the judgment to be vacated and the case remanded for additional
findings." State ex rel. Rooney v. One 1977 Subaru Two Door, VIN A26L-910, 450, 114
Idaho 43, 46 (1988).
At the evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss, Mr. Varela testified that he
parked "[i]n front of the trailer." (Tr., p.6, Ls.2-3.) He explained, "on the edge of the dirt,
that's where my car was parked." (Tr., p.8, Ls.6-9.) When asked, "Was the back of
your car sticking out on the roadway?" Mr. Varela replied, "No.

Because this part is

long, the car was able to fit there; and it was open right there." (Tr., p.8, Ls.15-18.) On
cross-examination, Mr. Varela testified that his car was not out past the edge of the
parking space into the road. (Tr., p.14, Ls.22-25.)
Mr. Varela's brother, Luis Carlos Varela, testified that after he received a call
from his mother-in-law about the incident and went to the trailer, he saw Mr. Varela's car
"located where the dirt is." (Tr., p.16, L.17 - p.20, L.20.) When asked "What part of the
car, if any, was sticking out onto the pavement of the trailer park street?" Luis Varela
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answered, "It's a pretty short car. But if any, it would have been the back because the
car was facing the front of the house."

(Tr., p.21, Ls.5-9.)

On cross-examination,

Luis Varela testified that it was his testimony that Mr. Varela's car was parked in the dirt.
(Tr., p.23, Ls.8-21.)
Officer Fielding testified that, when he arrived at the trailer, the car "was parked
with its nose a little bit in the dirt, but it was kind of double-parked by another car and
with the - its rear end out onto the roadway there." (Tr., p.29, Ls.10-13.) According to
the officer, "It was parked so the nose was kind of in the dirt and the back end was out
on the roadway there." (Tr., p.30, Ls.16-17.) On cross-examination, Officer Fielding
testified that, "The front nose of it was parked on the dirt, facing the trailer," and that,
"The back tires were on the roadway." (Tr., p.33, L.24 - p.34, L.5.)
Ashley Littleford, the neighbor who complained to the police, testified that the car
"was parked in front of the other trailer with only probably about the two front tires in the
dirt." (Tr., p.36, L.1 - p.37, L.7.) On cross-examination, she testified that, "Not even
half of it was in the grass." (Tr., p.43, L.17.)
The district court found, "After the vehicle was stopped and parked, a portion of
the vehicle extended into the roadway area ... the back portion of [Mr. Varela's] vehicle
extended beyond the dirt into the trailer park's roadway." (R., pp.100, 103.) The district
court concluded: "A portion of [Mr. Varela's] vehicle was in the trailer park's roadway
which was open to the public whereby [Mr. Varela] was subject to I.C. § 18-8004."
(R., p.104.)
Idaho Code § 18-8004( 1) makes it a crime "for any person who is under the
influence of alcohol ... to drive or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
within this state ... upon public or private property open to the public." The "upon
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public or private property open to the public" element is a subsection of one of the
"essential elements or material allegations of the crime of DUI" that must be proven to
prove the commission of the crime of DUI.

State v. Barker, 123 Idaho 162, 165

(Ct. App. 1992).
"The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute;
those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute
must be construed as a whole.

If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not

construe it, but simply follows the law as written." Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'/ Med.

Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the DUI
statue does not specifically define "upon," see I.C. § 18-8004, the word should be given
its "plain, usual, and ordinary meaning." See Verska, 151 Idaho at 893.
According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, "upon" means "on."
Webster

Dictionary,

Upon,

accessed Sept. 26, 2013).

Merriam-

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/upon

(last

"On" means "touching and being supported by the top

surface of (something)," or "to a position that is supported by (something)." MerriamWebster Dictionary, On, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/on (last accessed
Sept. 26, 2013). The full definition of "on" includes "used as a function word to indicate
position in contact with and supported by the top surface of." Id. Mr. Varela submits
that the above definition of "on" is the "plain, usual, and ordinary meaning" of "upon" for
purposes of the DUI statute.
Here, the district court found that "a portion of the vehicle extended into the
roadway area ... the back portion of [Mr. Varela's] vehicle extended beyond the dirt into
the trailer park's roadway." (R., pp.100, 103.) The district court concluded: "A portion of
[Mr. Varela's] vehicle was in the trailer park's roadway which was open to the public
9

whereby [Mr. Varela] was subject to I.C. § 18-8004." (R., p.104.) However, the district
court did not make a finding of fact as to whether Mr. Varela's car was upon the road
within the trailer park, i.e., that the car was touching and being supported by the top
surface of the roadway.
The question of whether the car was upon the road within the trailer park
was disputed.

The facts were disputed regarding whether Mr. Varela's car was

touching and being supported by the top surface of the roadway: Mr. Varela and
Luis Varela testified that the car was parked in the dirt (Tr., p.8, Ls.6-9, p.23, Ls.8-21 ),
while Officer Fielding testified that the back tires of the car were on the roadway
(Tr., p.33, L.24 - p.34, L.5), and Ms. Littleford testified that the car had only probably
about the two front tires in the dirt (Tr., p.37, Ls.4-7).
Considering the facts were disputed, the district court's determination that a
portion of Mr. Varela's car "extended into the roadway area" or that a portion of the car
"was in the trailer park's roadway" does not show that the district court found that that
car was upon the road within the trailer park. If Mr. Varela's car were upon the road
within the trailer park, the car's rear tires would have been touching and being
supported by the top surface of the roadway. However, the cargo compartment of the
car behind the rear tires could have extended into the roadway area, or could have
been in the road, without the rear tires actually touching and being supported by the
road. Thus, the district court did not make a factual finding that Mr. Varela's car was
upon the road within the trailer park.
Whether Mr. Varela's car was upon the road within the trailer park is a factual
issue essential to the question of whether the DUI statute covered his conduct. See
I.C. § 18-8004(1).

Because the district court did not make a factual finding that
10

Mr. Varela's car was upon the road within the trailer park, the district court did not
comply with Idaho Criminal Rule 12, which requires that, "Where factual issues are
involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its essential findings on the
record." I.C.R. 12(e). Further, one of the "essential elements or material allegations of
the crime of DUI" was not proven. See Barker, 123 Idaho at 165. Mr. Varela submits
that the district court therefore failed to make a finding of fact on what was basically a
"material issue[] affecting the judgment." See State ex rel. Rooney, 114 Idaho at 46.
Thus, the judgment should be vacated and the case remanded for the district court to
make a factual finding as to whether the car was upon the road in the trailer park.
See id.

11.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Varela's Motion To Dismiss

A.

Introduction
Mr. Varela asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to

dismiss, because Officer Fielding had no probable cause to make the warrantless
arrest. Officer Fielding lacked probable cause that a crime was being committed as to
the "upon public or private property open to the public" element of the DUI statute.
Even if a portion of Mr. Varela's car were upon the road within the trailer park,
Mr. Varela's conduct did not occur upon private property open to the public because the
road within the trailer park was not open to the public. Mr. Varela's conduct was not a
crime. Thus, the charge against Mr. Varela should have been dismissed.
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B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court reviews a district court's decision on a motion to dismiss a

criminal action for an abuse of discretion. State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775,
778 (Ct. App.2012).

When a district court's discretionary decision is reviewed on

appeal, the appellate court determines whether the district court: (1) correctly perceived
the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3)
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.

State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,

600 (1989).
The present case involves the question of whether the district court acted
consistently with the legal standards applicable to whether Officer Fielding had probable
cause to support a warrantless arrest.

See Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho at 778.

When reviewing a district court's finding of probable cause, an appellate court defers to
the district court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence and
reviews de novo whether those facts as found constitute probable cause. Id.

C.

Officer Fielding Lacked Probable Cause To Make The Warrantless Arrest,
Because Mr. Varela's Conduct Did Not Occur Upon Private Property Open To
The Public
Mr. Varela asserts that Officer Fielding had no probable cause to make the

warrantless arrest.

Officer Fielding lacked probable cause that a crime was being

committed as to the "upon public or private property open to the public" element of the
DUI statute.

Mr. Varela's conduct did not occur upon private property open to the

public, meaning that Mr. Varela's conduct was not a crime.
A search or seizure of a person without a warrant is presumed to violate the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article !, section 17 of the
12

Idaho Constitution unless a recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies.
State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302 (2007). An arrest is "the quintessential seizure of the
person" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,
624 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). For an arrest without a warrant to be
considered lawful, it must be based on probable cause to believe that a person has
committed a crime in the presence of an officer. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 817
(2009). "Probable cause exists when 'the facts and circumstances known to the officer
warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been [or is being] committed."'
Id. (quoting Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959)) (alteration in original).
While an arresting officer may make some mistakes, the "mistakes must be those of
reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusion of probability." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, because Officer Fielding was without a warrant when he arrested
Mr. Varela for DUI in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004 (see PSI, pp.2-3), for the
warrantless arrest to be considered lawful Officer Fielding must have had probable
cause to believe that Mr. Varela violated the DUI statute.

See Bishop, 146 Idaho

at 817.
As discussed above, Idaho Code§ 18-8004(1) makes it a crime "for any person
who is under the influence of alcohol ... to drive or being in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle within this state ... upon public or private property open to the public."
For purposes of the DUI statute, "private property open to the public" is defined as "real
property not owned by the federal government or the state of Idaho or any of its political
subdivisions, but is available for vehicular traffic or parking by the general public with
the permission of the owner or agent of the real property." I.C. § 49-117(16); State v.
13

Knott, 132 Idaho 476, 479-80 (1999), abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. Saint
Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889 (2011).

Mr. Varela asserts that, even if a portion of his car were upon the road within the
trailer park, Mr. Varela's conduct did not occur upon private property open to the public
because the road within the trailer park was not open to the public.
In Knott, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the DUI statute does not cover the
driveway of a private residence, because a private residential driveway was not
"available to the general public." Knott, 132 Idaho at 480. The Court stated that "the
fact that social guests and persons with business at the residence are permitted to use
the driveway does not make it property available to the general public for vehicular
travel or parking." Id.
Prior to Knott, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the DUI statute covers the
parking lot of a tavern.

State v. Gibson, 126 Idaho 256, 256-57 (Ct. App. 1994),

overruled on other grounds by Knott, 132 Idaho 476.

In Gibson, the Court looked to

physical factors, such as the lack of physical barriers or posted signs controlling access
to the property, and the nature of the property, such as the property's immediate
accessibility from the public sidewalk and openness to the patronage of any person, in
determining that the tavern parking lot was "open to the public." Id. at 258.
After Knott, the Idaho Court of Appeals held for purposes of a municipal open
container ordinance that a privately-owned parking lot was generally open to the public,
and that an open container on such property would violate the ordinance.
Schmitt, 144 Idaho 768 (Ct. App. 2007).

State v.

In making that determination, the Court in

Schmitt looked to factors drawn from the analysis of the DUI statute in Gibson and
Knott, such as the lack of fencing around the parking lot or posted signs indicating the
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parking lot was unavailable to the public, and the fact that the parking lot was the only
access to the public business entrance of a warehouse. Id. at 771-72.
More recently, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the DUI statute covers the
parking lot of a large apartment complex. State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775,
782-86 (Ct. App. 2012). The Court, in determining that the apartment complex parking
lot was "private property open to the public," looked to the size of the apartment
complex and adjacent parking lots, its access by a considerable number of tenants,
visitors and other members of the public, the lack of a gate or other restriction to
access, and the lack of any signs indicating that it was private property. Id. at 785-86.
Synthesizing the Knott, Gibson and Schmitt decisions, the Court in MartinezGonzalez "clarif[ied] the two steps necessary to determine if private property is 'open to
the public' for purposes of Idaho's DUI statute." Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho at 784.
The Court also based these steps on decisions from other jurisdictions concerning
whether their respective DUI statutes applied to parking lots and other areas around
trailer parks, condominiums, and apartment complexes. Id. at 783-84. Additionally, the
Martinez-Gonzalez Court noted "that without definitive or categorical statutory language,
decisions will necessarily have to be made on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 785.
"First, the private property must be 'available for vehicular travel or parking by the
general public."'

Id. (quoting I.C. § 49-117(16)) (emphasis in original).

Following

Gibson, the Court stated that "the general public does not mean everybody is welcome
on the property all of the time, but simply means an indefinite and undefined group of
people." Id. at 785 (citing Gibson, 126 Idaho at 258).
One needs to consider whether the property is business or residential and
whether the area is immediately accessible from a public sidewalk or
street. Where the parking lot is part of a residential complex, the size of
the complex and whether the location is a common area will also be
15

factors in determining whether it is available to the general public. For
example, individual driveways in a duplex or fourplex accessible from a
single common way, where a tenant may exercise fairly exclusive control,
are likely more akin to a private residential driveway not intended to be
covered by the statute, depending on the particular facts and
circumstance. With only a few residents living on such property, the group
is more definite and defined as opposed to a business, even a small one
such as the tavern in Gibson, where generally any member of the public is
invited to patronize the business-generally making it open to the public
subject only to an indication by the owner to keep the public out. Size and
capacity of a residential complex is of consequence because the larger
the complex, the more its users grow to an indefinite and undefined group
and the less control a single resident can exercise over the
common areas.
Id.

Second, the private property "must be property available to the public 'with the
permission of the owner.!!! Id. (quoting I.C. § 49-117(16)). "[T]his is a question of the
owner's intent: the statute does not cover private property not intended for public use."
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The intent of the owner is evaluated by observing limitations to access,
such as the presence of physical barriers, posted signs restricting the
types of users, and whether there are expressed consequences for entry.
Just as a business owner may show its intent to keep its parking area
private by restricting its use to "employees only" or by some other device,
so too may an owner of a residential complex deny permission to the
public to access its common areas.
Id.

Here, the two-step analysis outlined by the Idaho Court of Appeals in MartinezGonzalez shows that the road within the trailer park was not open to the public. First,

the road within the trailer park was not available for vehicular travel or parking by the
general public.

See Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho at 784. Unlike the parking lots in

Gibson, see 126 Idaho at 258, and Schmitt, see 144 Idaho at 771-72, the road within

the trailer park did not give access to a business. In fact, the district court found, "No
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business is conducted on the premises and the park is solely for residential purposes."
(R., p.100.)
The small scale of the trailer park also indicates that the road within the trailer
park was not available for vehicular travel or parking by the general public.

The

apartment complex in Martinez-Gonzalez was "comprised of not merely a single
entrance and a few residential parking spots, but rather has eight to ten different
housing units, three different roadways with at least two intersections, and numerous
parking areas." Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho at 785. The numbering scheme of the
apartment complex indicated that it contained at least thirty-seven different apartments.
See id. at 777 (stating that, at one point, the defendant "drove across the parking lot

towards apartment thirty-seven").
In contrast, the trailer park here only contained about thirteen trailer homes and
one non-trailer residential home, as well as the single "L" shaped roadway. (R., p.99.)
The district court found, 'The single road within the trailer park is not a through road and
does not travel beyond the trailer park." (R., p.99.) Thus, the road within the trailer park
is more akin to the private residential driveway from Knott, 132 Idaho at 480, or to an
individual duplex or fourplex driveway accessible from a single common way, as
mentioned in Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho at 785. While the trailer park is somewhat
larger than a private residence, duplex, or fourplex, its size and capacity is not so large
as to make its users an indefinite and undefined group. See Martinez-Gonzalez, 152
Idaho at 785. Thus, the road within the trailer park was not available for vehicular travel
or parking by the general public.
Second, the facts of this case may indicate that the road within the trailer park
was not intended by the owner to be open to the public. See Martinez-Gonzalez, 152
17

Idaho at 785.

While there was no fence or gate across the road, there was some

fencing around the trailer park itself. (R., p.100.) Admittedly, there were "no posted
signs restricting access to the trailer park."

(R., p.100.)

Thus, it may be unclear

whether the owner of the trailer park intended the trailer park to be open or closed to the
public. There were "physical barriers" present (in the form of some fencing), but no
"posted signs restricting the types of users." See Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho at 785.
However, the facts here may nonetheless indicate that the owner of the trailer park
intended that the road within the trailer park be kept closed to the public.
The two-step analysis from Martinez-Gonzalez shows that the road within the
trailer park was not open to the public, because the road within the trailer park was not
available for vehicular travel or parking by the general public, and it may not have been
intended by the owner to be open to the public. Thus, Officer Fielding lacked probable
cause that a crime was being committed as to the "upon public or private property open
to the public" element of the DUI statute.
Mr. Varela's conduct did not occur upon private property open to the public,
meaning that his conduct was not a crime. Because Officer Fielding lacked probable
cause to believe that a crime was being committed as to the "upon public or private
property open to the public" element of the DUI statute, Officer Fielding had no probable
cause to make the warrantless arrest. The charge against Mr. Varela should have been
dismissed. Thus, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Varela's motion to dismiss.
The order denying Mr. Varela's motion to dismiss should be vacated, and his case
should be remanded to the district court with instructions to allow Mr. Varela to withdraw
his guilty plea, and dismiss the case.
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111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Eight
Years, With Two Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Varela Following His Plea Of Guilty
To Felony DUI
Mr. Varela asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his
sentence because his unified sentence of eight years, with three years fixed, is
excessive considering any view of the facts.

Where a defendant contends that the

sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will
conduct an independent review of the record giving "due regard to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest." State v.

Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence." State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

Mr. Varela does not allege that his sentence exceeds the

statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Varela
must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive
considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of criminal
punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing. Id. An appellate court, "[w]hen reviewing the length of a sentence ...
consider[s] the defendant's entire sentence."

State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726

(2007). The reviewing court will "presume that the fixed portion of the sentence will be
the defendant's probable term of confinement." Id.
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Mr. Varela submits that his sentence is excessive considering any view of the
facts, because the district court did not adequately consider evidence of Mr. Varela's
substance abuse problems.

The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized substance

abuse as a mitigating factor in cases where it found a sentence to be excessive. See,

e.g., State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). Mr. Varela suffers from substance abuse
problems.

During the presentence investigation, he acknowledged that he had an

alcohol problem and stated that he desired treatment. (PSI, p.9.)

He reported

consuming alcohol on the weekends. (PSI, p.9.) The presentence investigator wrote
that Mr. Varela had received a substance abuse evaluation from Padron Counseling,
where he had previously completed a treatment program.

(PSI, p.9.)

"He was

diagnosed with Alcohol Dependence and it was recommended that he participate in
Level Two Intensive Outpatient Treatment." (PSI, p.9.)
Indeed, after Mr. Varela was evaluated at Padron Counseling, his GAIN-I
Recommendation and Referral Summary (GRRS) diagnosed him with "Alcohol
Dependence w/ Physiological Sx. - Early Full Remission." 1 (Mary Barreiro, GRRS, May
21, 2012, p.1.) 2

Mr. Varela "self-reported symptoms sufficient to meet criteria for

alcohol dependence with physiological symptoms," and "reported 5 lifetime problem(s)
specific to Alcohol Dependence." (GRRS, p.2.) Over the two to twelve months prior to
the evaluation, he reported "using alcohol in larger amounts, more often or for a longer
time than intended."

(GRRS, p.2.)

Additionally, more than one year prior to the

Mr. Varela's GAIN-I evaluation had been ordered in response to a DUI he had
allegedly committed a few months before the instant offense. (See GRRS, pp.1, 3.)
When Mr. Varela underwent the GAIN-I evaluation at Padron Counseling, he did not
disclose the instant offense to the evaluator. (See Mary Barreiro CADC, Padron
Counseling Services, LLC, Dimensional Update, Dec. 17, 2012). The Dimensional
Update is attached to the PSI.
2 The GRRS is attached to the PSI.
1
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evaluation, he reported needing more alcohol to achieve the same effect, withdrawal
problems from alcohol, being unable to cut down or stop using alcohol, and spending a
lot of time getting, using, or feeling the effects of alcohol. (GRRS, p.2.) The evaluator
recommended Level I Outpatient treatment for Mr. Varela.

(GRRS, p.9.)

Later, the

same evaluator recommended Level 11.1 Intensive Outpatient treatment for Mr. Varela.
(Dimensional Update, p.2.)
Mr. Varela's criminal history, including the instant offense, is connected to his
substance abuse problems. The presentence investigator wrote that Mr. Varela had six
prior DUI convictions. (PSI, p.6.) After Mr. Varela's GAIN-I evaluation, the evaluator
discovered that Mr. Varela had committed two additional DUls. (Dimensional Update,
p.1.) Those DUls were missing from the PSl's account of Mr. Varela's criminal history.
(See PSI, p.5.) At the sentencing hearing, the State attributed the missing DUls to

spelling changes or mistakes with Mr. Varela's name. (Tr., p.53, Ls.1-20.)
The presentence investigator recommended Mr. Varela for retained jurisdiction,
which would allow him to "[p]articipate in substance abuse treatment."

(PSI, p.10.)

Mr. Varela's trial counsel agreed with the presentence investigator and recommended
retained jurisdiction because that "would allow [Mr. Varela] to go ahead and get some
treatment that we believe is necessary." (Tr., p.55, Ls.1-7.) The district court retained
jurisdiction to give Mr. Varela "a chance to do some inpatient treatment." (Tr., p.60,
Ls.3-6.) However, adequate consideration of Mr. Varela's substance abuse problems
should have also led to a lesser underlying sentence.
Because the district court did not adequately consider Mr. Varela's substance
abuse problems, the sentence imposed is excessive considering any view of the facts.
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Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it imposed the unified sentence of
eight years, with two years fixed.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Varela respectfully requests that this Court vacate
the judgment and remand his case for the district court to make a factual finding as to
whether the car was upon the road in the trailer park.

Alternatively, Mr. Varela

respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order denying his motion to dismiss the
charging information, and remand his case to the district court with instructions to allow
Mr. Varela to withdraw his guilty plea, and dismiss the case. Alternatively, Mr. Varela
respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate, or
that this Court remand his case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 2J1h day of September, 2013.

e~:~:7},-~,---,,~,
-BE-N-PA_T_R-IC_K_M_C_G_R_E_E\/'(___,,,,,--.,-·/"
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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